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THE SEC AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: A VIEW FROM
THE PRESS
Robert MIMS *
Robert MUns focuses on the major issues during the recent "era of corporate disclosure." While
observing that the SEC's corporate financial mandates have served well in providing for thefree flow of
timely, accurate and useful information, the author argues that some of the same problems resurface
regularly to hamper disclosure. Mints applauds the SEC's deference to the private sector in formulating
accounting guidelines and he hopes for continued cooperation between the Commission and the
financial press in furthering the goals of the disclosure syste"n
For those who cover the world of corporate finance and accounting in the
business press, the words "Securities and Exchange Commission" immediately
trigger the response "disclosure." In undertaking my assignment for this
discussion paper, I took a nostalgic return trip through more than fifteen years
of clippings from stories I had written for Business Week. While my stint at the
magazine does not come close to spanning the history of this noted govern-
mental agency and touches only a small part of its mandate, it does encompass
what has undoubtedly been one of the SEC's most active, turbulent, and
interesting periods - the years centering on the decade of the 1970s, which
could be rightly termed "the new era of corporate financial disclosure." What
follows are some observations on the key issues that were singled out for
interpretation to our readers during a period that began with the booming
go-go-stock days on Wall Street, coupled with a binge of litigation against
accountants, and unwound in a roller coaster economic setting amid successive
throes of inflation, stagflation, recession, and recovery. And just in case life got
a little dull, there always were those around who continued to press for new
interpretations of the age-old issue: Who should devise the rules for corporate
financial accountability and how?
Taken together, my two main observations from my journey into the past
are a paradox. In reviewing a decade and a half of problems, pronouncements,
and assorted crises, I am struck by how far we have come in -financial
reporting. In the 1960s, a financial journalist who really did his or her job had
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to trek down to the SEC Library and pore over the 10-K report for clues to
events that might sway a particular company's economic fortunes. Now it is a
welcome relief to find much of the key data at one's immediate disposal in the
annual report to shareholders. At the same time, many of the same problems
still are with us - those that resurface with some regularity, albeit in new
guises. For example, it took approximately ten years of actual effort (preceded,
no doubt, by an equal number of years of mere talk) to get breakdowns of
company sales and earnings by broad business lines [1]. I understand that there
is now some thought about requiring the same kind of product-line data in
quarterly reports. Of course, many of those who oppose this proposal were
those who opposed any kind of required product-line revelations a decade ago.
Despite the frustrations with a system that may take ten years or more to
effect such relatively simple, straightforward proposals, I think that we must
applaud the SEC's early decision to look to the professional, nongovernmental
sector for the major leadership in setting the nation's actual accounting rules,
as well as its continued vigorous defense of that position. It may be an
imperfect system but, like democracy, it is preferable to the alternatives [2].
Between the demands, on the one hand, of securities analysts, who would like
every conveivable scrap of corporate data, and journalists, who want to have
everything they want as soon as they weant it; and, on the other hand,
corporate executives who would prefer to reveal absolutely nothing about
company financial matters, there is a reasonable middle range of financial
disclosure that works to the mutual benefit of all interested parties, including
the public at large. In an atmosphere of creative tension, the SEC and its
counterparts from business and the accounting profession together can point
with pride to a stream of corporate disclosure procedures that have established
and maintained U.S. financial reporting as the best on the globe.
The absence of fixed, uniform accounting principles can be irritating.
Trying to compare the performance of a company that utilizes a LIFO
inventory system with one that uses FIFO is problematic; so is trying to
compare a company that uses accelerated depreciation for both tax and book
reporting with a company that employs the straight-line method for share-
holder reports. But the financial reporting system has been radically altered in
less than twenty years so that better data are available. For example, annual
reports to shareholders now contain essentially the same information as 10-K
reports [3], quarterly breakdowns are made of sales, profits and income [4],
audited balance sheets for the two mosts recent fiscal years must be furnished
to securities holders [5], and minimal management analysis of financial condi-
tion must be included [6].
Yet despite the move toward greater disclosure, these rules and others have
not been met with unqualified success. Particularly noteworthy were the
Alphonse-Gaston gyrations in the middle 1970s between the SEC and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) over inflation accounting [7].
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While siding with those who assert the superiority of some kind of replacement
or current-value measurement for inventory and fixed assets [8], 1 believe that
almost any attempt at inflation accounting is better than none at all. The
controversy essentially confused and soured most of the business community
toward the whole notion of accounting for changing prices. In addition, there
was no inflation-accounting requirement in place at the very time inflation was
beginning to soar. Only now, when no one is worrying much about inflation,
are we beginning to get meaningful multi-year inflation-adjusted data. In
hindsight, the public would have been far better served had the proposed and
tested price-level method, or a vastly simplified version, been utilized im-
mediately. Then the vast energy spent on all the debates about methodology
and superiority could have been directed at some of the anomalies, such as the
accounting in industries where prices actually were falling.
Despite the lessening of inflation in the past few years, I believe that
inflation accounting is extremely important. What disturbs me is that almost
no one else does. Inflation accounting has not been given a fair test; too little
attention and imagination have been given to ways in which the new informa-
tion can be used and interpreted. I have reviewed the data on changing prices
for approximately 500 of the nation's largest corporations for the past five
years. When one-third of that group fails to include the related historical-cost
numbers alongside its five-year inflation-adjusted figures, thereby forcing
readers to go to five or six other separate places in the annual report to make
comparisons, then something is amiss in the disclosure system.
In addition to the dispute over inflation accounting, the confusion between
the SEC and the FASB over oil and gas accounting was unfortunate [9]. The
FASB badly underestimated the economic and political implications of the
issue. This strained its relationship with the SEC at the very time both
organizations were under considerable fire from critics. Neither group can
afford a replay of such a scene in the years ahead.
Even though most of the recent attempts at greater disclosure have been
welcomed, some of the SEC's actions are disturbing. It is difficult to under-
stand the SEC's continual moves to encourage official corporate financial
forecasts - particularly forecasts of future earnings [10]. No doubt the SEC
believes that the public should have access to the informal forecasts that have
always been available to securities analysts, but what happens when those
forecasts begin to go awry? We at Business Week feel that once an official
earnings projection is made, management will try to meet that projection, even
if it means taking hasty year-end actions that could jeopardize the health of the
company or, worse, manipulating the financial figures. Rather than encourag-
ing corporate forecasts, we believe they should be discouraged [111.
Moreover, I also am quite skeptical about the SEC's recent blessing of the
change in the way the nation's banks report their income. In an era when both
corporate management and Wall Street traders tended to focus on earnings per
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share and were rewarded for spectacular short-term results, it was always
instructive to point to banking as an industry that actually had two income
numbers, one from operations and another that incorporated factors somewhat
removed from the day-to-day operations, and to suggest that the rest of
corporate America could benefit from such a dual income statement presenta-
tion. Alas, that example no longer is possible, at least until the FASB gets its
financial statement revision project off the back burner. At a time when a close
look at the health of bank earnings becomes more critical, it now is far harder
to trace the sources of their reported annual or quarterly income. The change
also makes it far easier for bank executives to "manage" earnings simply by
timing the sale of securities.
In my area at Business Week, the dozen annual and quarterly scoreboards
of corporate performance, my goal is to get relevant financial data to our
readers as quickly as possible. One of the key factors that has enabled financial
reporters to do a far beter job during the past decade has been the develop-
ment of vastly improved quarterly financial reporting, including income state-
ment data and more detailed balance sheet information. As a result, it is
possible to update such things as debt positions, fixed-charge coverage ratios,
current ratios, and net worth at any time during the year; it was not that long
ago when we had to wait for an annual report. We also applaud the new efforts
to add additional information to those quarterly reports [12].
For most users of financial reporting the demand is always for more
immediate disclosure. In the 1970s, I recall difficulties in doing some halfway
realistic financial analysis on Jimmy Ling's far-flung empire based upon his
published reports. Often, by the time those documents were issued, he already
had acquired a half dozen new companies, spun off a handful of other
operations, and completely revamped the remaining financial structure. These
days, far more stringent disclosure requirements, including more detailed
quarterly filings, make a similar task much more manageable.
While I recall the welcome day it was in the late 1960s when the SEC turned
to the private sector to provide more widespread and rapid access to its 10-K
reports, many of us now eagerly await the next logical step in that chain: the
dissemination of financial reports via electronic networks, and again ap-
parently through nongovernmental means. In an age when more rapid com-
munication is not only possible but demanded, I would urge the SEC to use
this opportunity to shorten the deadlines for such filings. But fully as im-
portant as timeliness these days is the quality of financial reports. For the most
part, we have a very good set of disclosure rules. The time has come to
concentrate on the quality of the financial reports based on those regulations. I
am delighted that the SEC recently has given top priority to the enforcement of
existing disclosure requirements [13]. It is important for those who prepare
documents to be continually reminded that someone out there does care about
what is being presented and is taking a look at its fairness and completeness.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss3/13
R. Minis / SEC and corporate financial disclosure
Staring down from my bookshelf is a light green 1,760-page tome entitled
The Accounting Establishment (Metcalf Report) [14], issued almost eight years
ago. In my opinion, this report represents the biggest wild goose chase that I
have ever encountered in my journalistic career. It is not at all comforting to
think that such a circus is about to begin again, orchestrated by some of the
same instant experts and "professional" critics. Who knows what the effort
will produce this time around? It is a little humbling to realize just how
vulnerable a system for corporate financial reporting we do have. In addition,
it serves as another example of how many of the issues in financial accounta-
bility are continually recycled.
Finally, as the SEC is in the midst of a new controversy concerning insider
trading and the financial press [15], I cannot help but recall that one of my
earliest introductions to the SEC came from coverage of the legendary Texas
Gulf Sulphur case [16]. One wishes that the facts were such that produced
clear-cut, black-and-white conclusions. But in this, as in many ground-break-
ing issues, there seem to be shades of gray. I can only hope that clarity rather
than confusion comes from any legal decision and that the working relation-
ship between the SEC and the financial press - generally an arms-length one
of understanding and mutual respect for fifty years - does not become an
adversary relationship. We both have too much interest in the broader concern
for the widespread free flow of timely, accurate, and useful corporate financial
information to allow that to occur.
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